This study describes the Indian corporate governance system and examines how the system has both supported and held back India's ascent to the top ranks of the world's economies. While on paper the country's legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, the reality is different with slow, over-burdened courts and widespread corruption. Consequently, ownership remains highly concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model. There is significant pyramiding and tunneling among Indian business groups and, notwithstanding copious reporting requirements, widespread earnings management. However, most of India's corporate governance shortcomings are no worse than in other Asian countries, and its banking sector has one of the lowest proportions of non-performing assets, signifying that corporate fraud and tunneling are not out of control.
Introduction
One of the major economic developments of this decade has been the recent take-off of India, with growth rates averaging in excess of 8% for the past four years, a stock market that has risen over three-fold in as many years and a steady inflow of foreign investment. In 2006, total equity issuance reached $19.2 billion in India, up 22%, while merger and acquisition volume was a record $27.8 billion, up 38%, driven by a 371% increase in outbound acquisition--exceeding for the first time inbound deal volumes. Debt issuance reached an all-time high of $13.7 billion, up 28% from a year earlier. Indian companies were also among the world's most active issuers of depositary receipts in the first half of 2006, accounting for one in three new issues globally, according to the Bank of New York.
However, there are also concerns about overheating of the Indian economy, ongoing worries about the state of infrastructure, and signs of inflationary pressure and a real-estate bubble, so the sustainability of this growth depends critically on the state of corporate governance in the country. This concern about corporate governance in India is both reasonable and timely. Corporate governance issues in India, as in any other country, are multi-dimensional. For instance, the intricacies and opacity of conglomerates have been blamed for precipitating and/or prolonging many economic crises, especially the Asian crisis of 1997-98. A glance at India's 500 most valuable companies, that together account for over 90% of the market capitalization of the Bombay Stock Exchange, reveals that about 60% of the number of these companies (and 65% of total market capitalization), are part of conglomerates, or what are called "business groups". Clearly, family-run business groups still play a crucial role in the Indian corporate sector. Even in 2002, the average shareholding of promoters in all Indian companies was as high as 48.1% 1 , and recent studies have documented significant tunneling of funds among business groups. 2 The actual ownership of these companies is far from transparent with widespread pyramiding, cross-holding, and the use of non-public trusts and private companies for owning shares in group companies.
The small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) sector in India has played, and continues to play, an important role in India's growth story. As in many other countries, this sector largely consists of family enterprises in India. Recent research has documented serious credit constraints for firms in this sector, resulting in their ongoing reliance on informal finance. 3 In India, relationship based systems, characteristic of Asian countries, are usually far more important than the explicit arm's length systems of corporate governance and contracts observed in Western businesses. Survey evidence indicates scarce concern for business law among SME businessmen in India.
Indian firms also confront many legal problems and inadequacies. On paper, India, a former
British colony, has some of the best investor protection laws in the world. In reality, an extremely slow judicial system, marked by overburdened courts, makes application of those laws far from a simple matter. Corruption continues to be widespread. Consequently, many firms, particularly small ones, rely more on informal mechanisms of contract enforcement and dispute resolution than on the courts of law.
The aim of this paper is to present an overview of India's corporate governance system. The next section makes an assessment of the legal and institutional aspects of investor protection and corporate governance in India -both the letter of the law and the reality of its implementation. Section 3 briefly describes the historical evolution of corporate governance in India, while section 4 looks at changes in corporate governance since liberalization started in the early 1990's, including developments affecting corporate governance of financial institutions. Section 5 reviews the recent literature on corporate governance in India. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
The Institutional Environment in India -An Assessment
The Indian legal system is built on English common law and, on paper, provides one of the highest levels of investor protection in the world. India has a shareholder rights index of 5 (out of a maximum possible of 6). This is the highest in the rankings presented by Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lòpez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Rob Vishny in their 1998 study 4 , and is equal to those of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and South Africa (all English-origin-law countries), and higher than all the other 42 countries in the study including countries like France, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.
In terms of creditor rights, the Indian legal system also seems to provide excellent protection for lenders, according to the La Porta, et al (1998) metric. With no automatic stay on assets in the reorganization phase, the requirement that secured creditors are to be paid first, restrictions on going into reorganization, and the provision for replacing management in reorganization, India has a creditor rights index of 4 (the maximum possible), better than that of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United States, not to mention civil law countries. Transparency International. India also appears to have the worst accounting standards among the Englishorigin countries rated, though its score is better than the sample average across all countries. On the other hand, India gets a score of 8 out of 10 on the "efficiency of judicial system" variable, just behind the English-law average of 8.15 and better than the overall sample average of 7.67.
Financial/Business Laws and Regulations in India
Red tape and regulations are among the leading deterrents for business and foreign investment in India, leading to its latest ranking of 116 out of 155 in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business 2006 publication. 5 India consistently places in the bottom half of the sample for all aspects of business regulation (and is out of the top 100 for most aspects), except for investor protection. Starting a business in India is a monumental operation. Compared to their counterparts in OECD countries, India's entrepreneurs must follow twice the number of procedures, face about three and a half times the time delay, and close to nine times the cost as a proportion of per capita income. Delays and costs of dealing with licenses in India are also far higher than in OECD countries.
It is almost twice as hard to hire people in India as in OECD countries, and almost three times as hard and costly to fire them. There is considerable variation in labor laws across Indian states, and
Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess show that during the three and half decades before liberalization began in 1991, Indian states that followed more "pro-worker" policies experienced lower output, investment, employment and productivity in the registered or formal sector, as well as higher urban poverty and increased informal sector output.
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In the area of credit availability, India lags behind not because of creditors' rights (which are close to OECD standards, at least on paper) but because of the paucity of credit information available 
Stock Exchanges in India
India currently has two major stock exchanges--the National Stock Exchange, established in 1994, and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the oldest stock exchange in Asia, established in 1875.
Until 1992 the BSE was a monopoly, marked with inefficiencies, high costs of intermediation, and manipulative practices, so external market users often found themselves disadvantaged. The economics reforms created four new institutions: the Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI), the National Stock Exchange, the National Securities Clearing Corporation, and the National Securities Depository.
The National Stock Exchange (NSE) is a limited liability company owned by public sector financial institutions and now accounts for about two-thirds of the stock trading in India, as well as virtually all of its derivatives trading.
The National Securities Clearing Corporation is the legal counter-party to net obligations of each brokerage firm, and thereby eliminates counter-party risk and the possibility of payments crises. It follows a rigorous 'risk containment' framework involving collateral and intra-day monitoring. The NSCC, duly assisted by the National Securities Depository, has an excellent record of reliable settlement schedules since its inception in the mid-1990s.
The Securities and Exchanges Board of India has introduced a rigorous regulatory regime to ensure fairness, transparency and good practice. For example, for greater transparency, the SEBI has mandated disclosure of all transactions where the total quantity of shares is more than 0.5% of the equity of the company. Brokers must disclose to the Stock Exchange, immediately after trade execution, the name of the client and other trade details, and the Exchange must then disseminate this information to the general public on the same day. The new environment of improved transparency, fairness, and efficient regulation led BSE to also become a transparent electronic limit order book market in 1996, with an efficient trading system similar to the NSE. Equity and equity derivatives trading in India has skyrocketed to record levels over the last ten years.
In 2005, about 5000 companies were listed and traded on NSE and/or BSE. While the dollar value of trading on the Indian stock exchanges is much lower than the dollar value of trading in Europe or the United States, it is important to note that the number of equity trades on BSE/NSE is ten times greater than that of Euronext or the London Stock Exchange, and of the same order of magnitude as that of NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange. Similarly, the number of derivatives trades on NSE is several times greater than that of Euronext or London, and is comparable to US derivatives exchanges.
The number of trades is an important indicator of the extent of investor interest and participation in equities and equity trading, and provides important incentives for improving corporate governance practices in India. Some of these problems arise because of unsettled questions about jurisdictional issues and powers of the SEBI.
Enforcing Corporate Governance Laws

Indian Courts -an assessment
In their analysis of "formalism" in the judicial process around the world, Simeon Djankov and his co-authors give India a score of 3.34 on their formalism index, higher than the English-origin average of 2.76 but slightly lower than the 3.53 average for all countries. 11 Among the 42 English-origin countries in their sample, India has the 11 th highest level of formalism and the 16 th longest process for evicting a tenant (212 days) among English common law origin countries (average 199 days). For collection on a bounced check, however, India has the 16 th shortest duration (106 days) among English common law origin countries (average 176 days). In both cases, India's total process duration is significantly shorter than the overall mean duration for all the 109 countries considered (254 for eviction of a tenant and 234
for collecting on a bounced check, respectively). Thus, in spite of their formalism, Indian courts do not seem to perform that poorly (relatively speaking) on these two types of cases.
This assurance notwithstanding, case arrears and decade-long legal battles are commonplace in India. In spite of having around 10,000 courts (not counting tribunals and special courts), India has a serious shortfall of judicial servants. While the United States has 107 judges per million citizens, Canada over 75, Britain over 50 and Australia over 41, for India the figure is slightly over 10. 12 In April 2003, for instance, the Supreme Court of India had almost 25,000 cases pending before it. 13 Amab Hazra and Maja
Micevska report that about 20 million cases are pending in lower courts and another 3.2 million cases are pending in High Courts. 14 A termination dispute contested until all appeals are exhausted can take up to 20 years for disposal, while writ petitions in High Courts can take between 8 and 20 years. About 63% of pending civil cases are more than a year old, and 31% are over three years old. Automatic appeals, extensive litigation by the government, underdeveloped alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution like arbitration, and the shortfall of judges all contribute to this unenviable state of affairs in Indian courts.
Since the same courts try both civil and criminal matters, and the latter gets priority, economic disputes suffer even greater delays.
The Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector in India
Franklin Allen and his co-authors conduct surveys to measure how well the formal legal environment directly supports and regulates businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises that form an increasingly important part of Indian industry. 15 Their research indicates that small firms operate in a system governed almost completely with informal mechanisms based on trust, reciprocity and reputation, with little recourse to the legal system. The owners of these businesses also must deal with widespread corruption.
Over 80% of the firms surveyed needed a license to start a business, and for about half of them obtaining it was a difficult process. Government officials were most often the problem, which was usually solved through payment of bribes or by enlisting friends of government officials as negotiators. Clearly, networks and connections are crucially important to negotiating the government bureaucracy. As for conducting day-to-day business, legal concerns are far less important than the unwritten codes of the informal networks in which firms operate. In cases of default and breach of contract, the primary concern is loss of reputation, followed closely by loss of property, with the fear of legal consequences being the least important concern.
About half of the firms surveyed did not have a regular legal adviser, and less than half of those that did had lawyers in that capacity. For mediation in a business dispute or to enforce a contract, the first choice was "mutual friends or business partners." Only 20% of the respondents mentioned going to courts as the first option, indicating that the legal system, while not as effective as the informal mechanisms, is not altogether absent. The informal system, however, is far from perfect at resolving disputes and also has significant costs. About half of all respondents experienced a breach of contract or non-payment with a supplier or major customer in the past three years. Over a third of them renegotiated, while over 40% did nothing and continued doing business with the offending parties.
In general, the business environment of the SME sector is marked by strong informal mechanisms like family ties, reputation, and trust. Legal remedies, though present, are far less important than the rules of the informal networks.
Corporate Governance in India -A Historical Background
The historical development of Indian corporate laws has been marked by many interesting contrasts. At independence, India inherited one of the world's poorest economies but one which had a factory sector accounting for a tenth of the national product. The country also inherited four functioning stock markets (predating the Tokyo Stock Exchange) with clearly defined rules governing listing, trading and settlements, a well-developed equity culture (if only among the urban rich), and a banking system replete with well-developed lending norms and recovery procedures. 16 In terms of corporate laws and financial system, therefore, India emerged far better endowed than most other colonies. The 1956
Companies Act built on this foundation, as did other laws governing the functioning of joint-stock companies and protecting the investors' rights.
Early corporate developments in India were marked by the managing agency system. This contributed to the birth of dispersed equity ownership but also gave rise to the practice of management enjoying control rights disproportionately greater than their stock ownership. The turn towards socialism in the decades after independence, marked by the 1951 Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution, put in place a regime and culture of licensing, protection, and widespread red-tape that bred corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate sector. The situation worsened in subsequent decades and corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency became the hallmarks of the Indian corporate sector. Exorbitant tax rates encouraged creative accounting practices and gave firms incentives to develop complicated emolument structures.
In the absence of a stock market capable of raising equity capital efficiently, the three all-India development finance institutions (the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the Industrial Development
Bank of India and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India), became the main providers of long-term credit to companies together with the state financial corporations. Along with the government-owned mutual fund, the Unit Trust of India, these institutions also held (and still hold) large blocks of shares in the companies to which they lend and invariably have representations on their boards--though they traditionally play very passive roles in the boardroom.
The corporate bankruptcy and reorganization system has also faced serious problems. India's system is driven by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA), which considers a company "sick" only after its entire net worth has been eroded and it has been referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). As soon as a company is registered with the BIFR, it wins immediate protection from the creditors' claims for at least four years. Between 1987 and 1992, the BIFR took well over two years on average to reach a decision, after which the delay to resolution roughly doubled. Very few companies emerge successfully from the BIFR and even for those that need to be liquidated the legal process takes over 10 years on average, by which time the assets of the company are usually almost For most of the post-Independence era the Indian equity markets were not liquid or sophisticated enough to exert effective control over the companies. Listing requirements of exchanges enforced some transparency, but non-compliance was neither rare nor punished. All in all, therefore, minority shareholders and creditors in India remained effectively unprotected despite the laws on the books.
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance in India
The years since liberalization began in 1991 have witnessed wide-ranging changes in both laws and disclosures and accept responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective internal control systems. The company is also required to provide a separate section of corporate governance in its annual report, with a detailed compliance report on corporate governance. It should also submit a quarterly compliance report to the stock exchange where it is listed. Finally, it needs to get its compliance with the mandatory specifications of Clause 49 certified by auditors or by practicing company secretaries. In addition to these mandatory requirements, Clause 49 also mentions non-mandatory requirements concerning the facilities for a non-executive chairman, the remuneration committee, half-yearly reporting of financial performance to shareholders, moving towards unqualified financial statements, training and performance evaluation of board members, and perhaps most notably a clear "whistle blower" policy.
By and large, the provisions of Clause 49 closely mirror those of the Sarbanes-Oxley measures in the United States. In some areas, like certification compliance, the Indian requirements are even stricter. There are, however, areas of uniqueness as well. The distinction drawn between boards headed by executive and non-executive chairmen and the lower required share of independent directors is special to India-and is also somewhat intriguing, given the prevalence of family-run business groups.
The market reaction to the corporate governance improvements sought by Clause 49 seems to have been quite positive, somewhat in contrast to the mixed response to Sarbanes-Oxley's adoption.
Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh use an event-study approach to measure the stock price impact of the adoption of Clause 49 by Indian firms. 18 Focusing on the May 7, 1999 announcement by SEBI about the formation of the Kumar Mangalam Birla committee, when a earlier application to large companies was expected, they report that large firms that adopted these measures first witnessed a 4% (7%) positive price-jump in a two day (five-day) event-window beginning with the announcement day compared to smaller firms that were required to implement the reforms at the same time.
Corporate Governance of Banks
The reforms adopted since 1991 have marked a shift from hands-on government control to market forces as the dominant instrument of corporate governance in Indian banks. Nominee directors--from government as well as the RBI--are being gradually phased out, with a stress on boards being elected rather than "appointed from above." There is increasing emphasis on greater professional representation on bank boards, with the expectation that the boards will have the authority and competence to properly manage the banks within broad prudential norms set by the RBI. Rules like non-lending to companies that have one or more of a bank's directors on their boards are being softened or removed altogether, thus allowing for "related party" transactions for banks. The need for professional advice in the election of executive directors is increasingly being realized.
As for the old private banks, concentrated ownership remains a widespread characteristic, limiting the possibilities for professional excellence and opening the possibility of misdirecting credit.
Corporate governance in co-operative banks and non-bank financial companies perhaps needs the greatest attention from regulators. Rural co-operative banks are frequently run by politically powerful families as their personal fiefdoms, with little professional involvement and considerable channeling of credit to family businesses. It is generally believed that the "new" private banks (those established after the reforms process started in the 90's) have better and more professional corporate governance systems in place. 20 In recent years, the collapse of the private Global Trust Bank and its subsequent acquisition by a public sector bank has, however, strengthened beliefs that the government will ultimately bail out failing banks.
Public Sector Governance in India
Public sector Enterprises (PSEs) have been at the heart of India's mixed economy and 
Recent findings about corporate governance in India
Of late, a burgeoning empirical literature has begun to document important features of corporate governance in India. We summarize some of the major findings in this section, beginning with research examining corporate board composition.
Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar show that corporate boards of large companies in India in 2003
were slightly smaller than those in the United States (in 1991), with 9.46 members on average in India compared to 11.45 in America. 21 While the percentage of inside directors was roughly comparable (25.38% compared to 26% in the U.S.), Indian boards had relatively fewer independent directors, (just over 54% compared to 60% in the U.S.) and relatively more affiliated outside directors (over 20% versus 14% in the U.S.). 41% of Indian companies had a promoter on the board, and in over 30% of cases a promoter served as an Executive Director. There is evidence that larger boards lead to poorer performance (market-based as well as in accounting terms), both in India and in the United States.
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The median director in large Indian companies held 4.28 directorships in 2003, and this number is considerably (and statistically significantly) higher for directors in group-affiliated companies (4.85 versus 3.09 for non-affiliated companies). 23 The figures were similar for inside directors, being 4.34, 4.95 and 3.06 for large companies, group affiliates, and non-affiliated companies, respectively. As for independent directors, however, the median number of positions held was 4.59, with no major differences between group and stand-alone companies. Interestingly, independent directors with multiple directorships are associated with higher firm value in India while busier inside directors are correlated negatively with firm performance. Busier independent directors are also more conscientious in terms of attending board meetings than their counterparts with fewer positions. As for inside directors, it seems that the pressure of serving on multiple boards (due largely to the prevalence of family owned business groups) does take a toll on the directors' performance.
However, busy independent directors also appear to be correlated with a greater degree of earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals. 24 Multiple positions and non-attendance of board meetings by independent directors seem to be associated with higher discretionary accruals in 21 firms. After controlling for these characteristics of independent directors, board independence (measured by the proportion of independent directors) does not seem to affect the degree of earnings management.
However, CEO-duality, where the top executive also chairs the board, and the presence of controlling shareholders as inside directors are related, perhaps unsurprisingly, to greater earnings management.
Shareholding patterns in India reveal a marked level of concentration in the hands of the promoters. In 2002-03, for instance, Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sankar find that promoters held 47.74% of the shares in a sample of almost 2500 listed manufacturing companies, and held 50.78% of the shares of group companies and 45.94% of stand-alone firms. 25 In comparison, the Indian public's share amounted to 34.60%, 28% and 38.51%, respectively. As for the impact of concentrated shareholding on firm performance, an earlier study by these same authors finds that in the mid-90's (1995-96) holdings above 25% by directors and their relatives was associated with higher valuation of companies while there was no clear effect below that threshold. 26 More recently, based on 2001 data that distinguishes between "controlling" insiders and non-controlling groups, Ekta Selarka reports a U-shaped relationship between insider ownership (with insiders being defined as promoters and "persons acting in concert with promoters") and firm value, with the point of inflection lying at a much higher level, between 45% and 63%.
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Institutional investors--comprising government sponsored mutual funds and insurance companies, banks and development financial institutions (DFIs) that are also long-term creditors, and foreign institutional investors--hold over 22% shares of the average large company in India, of which the share of mutual funds, banks and DFIs, insurance companies, and foreign institutional investors are about 5%, 1.5%, 3% and 11%, respectively. Analyzing cross-sectional data from the mid-1990's, Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar find that company value actually declines with a rise in the holding of mutual funds and insurance companies in the range 0-25% holding, after which there is no clear effect. 28 On the other hand, During this period, the proportion of profit-based commission has risen steadily, from 13.4% to 25.6%, and the proportion of CEOs with commission as part of their pay package has risen from 0.34 to 0.51.
CEO pay has thus clearly become more performance based over the past decade. There is also some evidence that this increasing performance-pay linkage is associated with the introduction of the corporate governance code or Clause 49. Meanwhile, executive compensation as a fraction of profits has also almost doubled from 0.55% to 1.06%. Fagernäs also finds that CEOs related to the founding family or directors are paid more than other CEOs. In a firm fixed effects model, she finds being related to the founding family can raise CEO pay by as much as 30% while being related to a director can cause an increase of about 10%. There is some evidence that the presence of directors from lending institutions lowers pay while the share of non-executive directors on the board connects pay more closely to performance.
A recent study finds that, during 1997-2002, the average (of a sample of 462 manufacturing firms) board compensation in India has been around Rs. 5.3 million (approximately USD 120,000), with wide variation across firm size. 30 The average board compensation is Rs. 7.6 million (USD 171,000) for large firms and Rs. 2.5 million (USD 56,000) for small firms. The board compensation also appears to be higher, on average, at Rs. 6.9 million (USD 155,500) if the CEO is related to the founding family. Both board and CEO compensation depend on current performance, and CEO pay depends on past-year performance as well. Diversified companies also pay their boards more.
Given that almost two-thirds of the top 500 Indian companies are group-affiliated, issues relating to corporate governance in business groups are naturally very important. Tunneling, or "the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them" is a major concern in business groups with pyramidal ownership structure and inter-firm cash flows. 31 Marianne Bertrand and her coauthors estimate that an industry shock leads to a 30% lower earnings increase for business group firms compared to stand-alone firms in the same industry. 32 They find that firms farther down the pyramidal structure are less affected by industry-specific shocks than those nearer the top, suggesting that positive shocks in the former are siphoned off to the latter, benefiting the controlling shareholders but hurting the minority shareholders. However, Bernard Black and Vikramaditya Khanna question how this logic would make them less sensitive to negative shocks. 33 There is also some evidence that firms associated with business groups have superior performance than stand-alone firms. 34 More recently Raja Kali and Jayati Sarkar argue that diversified business groups help increase the opacity of within-group fund flows driving a wider wedge between control and cash flow rights. A greater degree of diversification also aids tunneling. 35 Using data for Indian firms in 385 business groups in 2002-03 and 384 groups in 2003-04, Kali and Sarkar find that firms with greater ownership opacity and a lower wedge between cash flow rights and control than those in a group's core activity are likely to be located farther away from the core activity. This incentive for tunneling explains, according to them, the persistence of value destroying groups in India and occasional heavy investment by Indian groups in businesses with low contribution to group profitability.
Using a sample of over 600 of the 1000 largest (by revenues) Indian firms in 2004, Jayashree
Saha finds that, after controlling for other corporate governance characteristics, firm performance is negatively associated with the extent of related party transactions for group firms but positively so for stand-alone companies. This further strengthens the circumstantial evidence of tunneling and its adverse effects. 36 The same study also reveals that, using a sample of over 5000 firms for the period 2003-2005, most related party transactions in India occur between the firm and "parties with control," as opposed to management personnel as in the United States. Also, group companies consistently report higher levels of related party transactions than stand-alone companies.
Transparency and corporate governance levels are very closely related. Cross-country studies have repeatedly put India among the worst nations in terms of earnings opacity and management. 37 Indian accounting standards provide considerable flexibility to firms in their financial reporting and differ from the International Accounting Standards (IAS) in several ways that often make interpreting Indian financial statements a challenging task. These deviations, however, need to be viewed in the right perspective. India still falls short of the median number of deviations from IAS in the 49 country sample of Kee-Hong Bae and co-authors. 38 The nature of corporate governance can affect the capital structure of a company. In the presence of well functioning financial institutions, debt can be a disciplining mechanism in the hands of shareholders or an expropriating mechanism in the hands of controlling insiders. Studying the relationship between leverage and Tobin's Q in 1996, 2000, and 2003, Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar conclude that the disciplinary effect has been more marked in recent years as institutions have adopted greater market orientations. 39 They also find limited evidence of the use of debt as an expropriating mechanism in group companies. 40 Merger activity appears to occur in waves and is split roughly evenly between inter-industry and intra-industry mergers. The share of group-affiliated mergers has increased significantly in the post 1994-95 period.
With regard to public sector governance, Nandini Gupta finds that even when control stays in government hands, partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment of the PSEs concerned. 41 She argues that the monitoring role of the markets has been responsible for this. Another study argues that the effect of partial privatization may have been confounded with the application of MoUs to these cases before the partial privatizations, finding that the application of MoUs or performance contracts has had a positive impact on profitability as well as operational performance of PSEs. 42 .
Conclusions
While on paper the Indian legal system provides one of the highest levels of investor protection in the world, the reality is very different with slow, over-burdened courts and widespread corruption.
Consequently, ownership is still concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model in India. There is evidence of pyramiding and tunneling among Indian business groups and signs of widespread earnings management in many firms. However, India's corporate governance system is changing fast with the rise of companies like Infosys that--free from a dominant family or group influence--make the individual shareholder the central governance focus. Implementation of SarbanesOxley type measures in Clause 49 of the listing agreements has improved corporate governance in larger firms.
While these changes are welcome signs that India's corporate sector is maturing, much of the country's extensive SME sector continues to be mired in relationship-based informal control and governance mechanisms. The limited faith in the formal, legal system of governance has most likely inhibited financing by Indian firms and kept the cost of capital at levels higher than necessary and, notwithstanding India's impressive realized growth rates in recent years, have had adverse effects on economic development.
However, it is important to bear in mind that, despite the corporate governance shortcomings discussed here, the Indian economy and its financial markets have attained impressive growth rates in recent years--second only to China. The informal mechanisms of India's SME sector appear to have worked effectively to circumvent the shortcomings of the legal system and have thus allowed high growth rates to coexist with poorly functioning legal institutions. Most of the corporate governance problems noted here, far from being unique to India, are in fact commonplace in Asia, and are present in many other economies as well. Concentrated ownership and family control are important in countries where legal protection of property rights is relatively weak. Weak property rights are also behind the prevalence of family-owned businesses, which are by nature organizational forms that reduce transaction costs and asymmetric information problems. Poor development of external financial markets also contributes to these ownership patterns. The effect of this concentrated ownership by management in Asian countries is not straightforward. Similar to the effects for US companies, in several East Asian countries firm value rises with largest owner's stake but declines as the excess of the largest owner's management control over his equity stake increases.
It is noteworthy that India has one of the best banking sectors in Asia, in terms of non-performing assets with the banking sector (often a measure of widespread corporate fraud). With NPL ratios at around 4% of total banking assets, it is far below those of China (or Japan) and most other Asian emerging markets. Recent changes, like the introduction and enforcement of corporate governance disclosures requirements (Clause 49) by the leading stock market significantly improve the level of transparency in India and paves the way for more changes to come that should help Indian industry ensure that financial gains reach investors and sustain its new-found prosperity and growth. 
